Sudan ranks #62 of 242 on the Composite Power Index (1.2/100), scored on military spending, active personnel, nuclear arsenal, economic size and logistics. Its Instability Index is 92.4/100 (#2 most fragile). Every figure below carries its source and year. Data read 2026-10-22.
Sudan is a large population resting on a small measured economy. World Bank WDI figures for 2024 put gross domestic product at about $49.7 billion, population at 50.4 million and output per head at roughly $985. The IMF's World Economic Outlook puts general government debt at 169.1 percent of GDP for 2026, meaning obligations run to more than one and a half times annual output.
Foreign reserves are the weakest link in the record rather than simply the weakest number. The only reserves observation available is $177.9 million, from the World Bank's WDI and dated 2017. Nothing more recent is supplied, so Sudan's current external buffer cannot be assessed from this dataset. Any statement about present-day reserve adequacy would be guesswork.
SIPRI's most recent entry for Sudan dates from 2021: military spending of $369.4 million, equal to 0.925 percent of GDP that year. No later SIPRI observation is supplied, so the defense burden through the intervening years is unknown here. Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data for 2022 record 104,000 active personnel and a CINC score of 0.00366 — roughly 0.37 percent of global material capability, since CINC is expressed as a share of the world total.
The gap between a sizable standing force and a sub-1-percent spending share is the salient feature: on the 2021 SIPRI figure, Sudan sustains manpower on a budget that is small in both absolute and relative terms. No arms-transfer, nuclear or casualty data is present for Sudan in this dataset, so force quality, materiel inflows and conflict intensity cannot be characterized.
V-Dem v15 scores for 2025 place Sudan near the bottom of each index, which runs from 0 to 1: electoral democracy at 0.13, liberal democracy at 0.034 and state capacity at 0.174. The state-capacity reading is the operationally important one — it indicates limited administrative reach, which bears directly on revenue collection, service delivery and territorial control.
Our World in Data records primary energy consumption of 0.3245 exajoules in 2023 and electricity generation of 14.77 terawatt-hours in 2024. Oil production stood at 21.614 TWh in 2024. Gas production is recorded at zero, but that observation dates from 2016 and should not be read as a current figure.
Reserves (2017), military spending (2021) and gas output (2016) are all substantially out of date. Trade, arms transfers, conflict events and casualty counts are absent entirely.
Sources: World Bank WDI; IMF WEO; SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; Correlates of War National Material Capabilities; V-Dem v15; Our World in Data (Energy).
Written from the sourced figures on this page and checked against them before publication — any figure not present in the data blocks the briefing. Generated 2026-10-06.
CINC is a composite index (already contains military spending, personnel, energy & population) — shown for reference; it is not added into the Composite Power Index to avoid double-counting. Each figure carries its own source year; vintages can differ.
COW alliance ties — includes historical pacts; defense first.
COW Dyadic MID, 1816–2014 — historical register, not live rivalries. Count = militarized disputes; year = most recent; ● = peak intensity.
Conflict forecast (ViEWS, 2029-04-01): 100% risk
Arms imports (SIPRI Arms Transfers, 2025): 2 transfers
22% of imports from Türkiye — supplier dependence
Displacement (UNHCR): 2.8M refugees originated · 9.1M IDPs · 809.8K hosted