Germany ranks #7 of 242 on the Composite Power Index (11.4/100), scored on military spending, active personnel, nuclear arsenal, economic size and logistics. Its Instability Index is 14.4/100 (#166 most fragile). Every figure below carries its source and year. Data read 2026-10-22.
Germany entered 2025 with substantial fiscal headroom by the measures available here. World Bank WDI data put 2024 gross domestic product at $4.69 trillion, with a population of 83.5 million and output per head of $56,104. The IMF's World Economic Outlook puts general government debt at 64.6 percent of GDP for 2026 — moderate against the size of the economy and a key reason Berlin can absorb higher defense outlays without acute financing strain.
Reserves stood at $101.7 billion in 2025, per IMF International Financial Statistics.
SIPRI's 2025 figures show military expenditure of $113.6 billion, equal to 2.269 percent of GDP. The spending figure is current — unlike much of the force-structure data in this file.
Personnel tell a different story. Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data record 183,000 active personnel as of 2022, with a CINC score of 0.015029, or roughly 1.5 percent of global material capability. Those are three-year-old observations, and no later personnel count is supplied. The gap between a current, high spending figure and a dated manpower figure is the central analytical caution in this file: money is being committed at a rate the available headcount data cannot yet confirm has translated into force.
No arms-transfer, nuclear or procurement-detail data is present for Germany in this dataset, so what the $113.6 billion is buying cannot be characterized here.
V-Dem v15 scores for 2025 are high across the board on indices running 0 to 1: electoral democracy 0.828, liberal democracy 0.782 and state capacity 0.991. The state-capacity reading is close to the ceiling, indicating an administrative apparatus capable of executing policy decisions once taken — relevant to any assessment of whether increased defense budgets convert into delivered capability.
Our World in Data records primary energy consumption of 11.5036 exajoules in 2024 and electricity generation of 500.47 TWh in 2025. Domestic gas production was 36.603 TWh in 2024. The oil production figure, 29.639 TWh, dates from 2016 and should not be read as current. Set against consumption, domestic hydrocarbon output is marginal, which keeps import dependence a structural feature of German energy security — though this dataset contains no import or supplier data to quantify that dependence.
Personnel and CINC are from 2022; oil production from 2016. Trade, energy imports, arms transfers and alliance commitments are absent.
Sources: World Bank WDI; IMF WEO; IMF IFS; SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; Correlates of War National Material Capabilities; V-Dem v15; Our World in Data (Energy).
Written from the sourced figures on this page and checked against them before publication — any figure not present in the data blocks the briefing. Generated 2026-10-06.
CINC is a composite index (already contains military spending, personnel, energy & population) — shown for reference; it is not added into the Composite Power Index to avoid double-counting. Each figure carries its own source year; vintages can differ.
COW alliance ties — includes historical pacts; defense first.
COW Dyadic MID, 1816–2014 — historical register, not live rivalries. Count = militarized disputes; year = most recent; ● = peak intensity.
Conflict forecast (ViEWS, 2029-04-01): 0% risk
Arms imports (SIPRI Arms Transfers, 2025): 18 transfers
48% of imports from United States — supplier dependence
Displacement (UNHCR): 327 refugees originated · 0 IDPs · 2.7M hosted